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the appropriate sentence. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(1990). However,
the Virginia verdict form does instruct the jury to consider both aggra-
vating and mitigating evidence. Further, Virginia law permits juries to
fix the penalty at life in prison even if aggravating circumstances are
found. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978). In
this respect, a "balancing" of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
almost certainly takes place.
In both Mills and McKoy, the Court stated that it is irrelevant
whether the barrier to the sentencer's consideration of all mitigating
evidence is imposed by statute, by the sentencing court, orby evidentiary
ruling. Whatever the cause, a procedure that impedes consideration of all
the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death penalty.
McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1233 (citing Mills, 486 U.S. at 375).
Notably, Virginia's verdict form and model instructions may act
as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating evidence. The Virginia
verdict form lists statutory aggravating factors for consideration. The
form generally refers to mitigating evidence but fails to explain the effect
mitigating evidence can have on the sentence. The model instructions do
not discuss evidence in mitigation at all. While the jury may consider
any mitigating circumstances, it is, in fact, uninformed as to what
constitutes a "mitigating factor."
Therefore, by close analogy, the Virginia model instructions and
verdict form may act as an impermissible barrier to a juror's ability to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence no less than the verdict
form and instructions which the Court struck down in McKoy.
Fortunately, the Court reiterated in McKoy that its decision re-
garding the consideration of mitigating evidence is not limited to those
cases in which the jury is required to impose the death penalty if it finds
that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or
that no mitigating circumstances exist at all. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1232.
Counsel should consider preparing alternative jury instructions to
properly inform the jury of its obligation to consider all mitigating
evidence and of its ability to impose a sentence less than death under any
circumstances. Defense counsel should also be prepared to object to the
model jury instructions as a barrier to consideration of mitigation
evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. McInerney
WHITMORE v. ARKANSAS
110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Ronald Gene Simmons was sentenced to death for multiple
homicide by an Arkansas court and fied a petition requesting expedited
review and waiver of his direct appeal. Simmons specifically requested
permission both to waive the appeals process and receive the death
penalty as soon as possible. SeeFranz v.State,296 Ark. 181,754S.W.2d
839 (1988). Arkansas has no rule requiring mandatory direct appeal of
capital case convictions and sentences, and the Arkansas Supreme Court
granted the requests. Jonas H. Whitmore, another death row inmate,
convicted of robbery-murder, had exhausted his direct appellate review,
been denied post-conviction relief, but had not yet initiated federal
habeas corpus proceedings. Whitmore attempted to intervene in Simmons'
case with a two-part argument claiming both direct interest in the
outcome and "next friend" status to assert the claims of Simmons.
Whitmore's direct interest approach asserted that the execution of
Simmons without appeal would violate his own eighth and fourteenth
amendment rights because Arkansas has a comparative review of capital
cases. This is achieved at the appellate level by comparing records in
Arkansas capital cases in an effort to ensure that the sentence of the
appellant is not disproportionate to the sentence of others similarly
situated. The comparative review is compiled from records of the direct
appeal procedure. It is this procedure which Simmons was permitted to
waive.
Whitmore reasoned that his injury arose from his future habeas
corpus appeal. He argued that if his future habeas corpus proceedings
resulted in a remand to state court and in that court he was sentenced to
death a second time, he would be entitled to a second comparative review
at the state level. At that putative review, Simmons' case would not be
in the pool of cases consulted, because Simmons waived his right to the
appeals process. The absence ofSimmons'case, therefore, couldprejudice
Whitmore because Whitmore would not be reviewed in comparison
with a possibly more culpable Simmons. He claimed this could result in
an unjust capital sentence. Reasoning on another personal standing
issue, Whitmore sought to intervene as an Arkansas citizen interested in
preserving constitutional governance. Alternatively, Whitmore sought
to enter into the case as Simmons' next friend.
HOLDING
In a seven to two decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
(Justice Marshall,joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting), the Court held
that Whitmore lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court
directly and that Whitmore could not bring an appeal for Simmons as
next friend.
The Court stated that in order to invoke the intervention of a
federal court in Simmons' case with respect to Whitmore's claimed
constitutional violations, Whitmore had to pass the "cases and contro-
versies" requirement of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The Court
set out the criteria necessary to meet the requirement: 1) demonstrate
injury-in-fact. Whitmore would have to show that Simmons' waiver of
his appeal would be directly responsible for Whitmore's execution. 2)
Satisfy the "causation andredressability" prongs of Article m. Whitmore
would have to show how entering Simmons' case would result in a
different sentence, in fact, for Whitmore.
The Court decided that Whitmore's argument was too speculative
to pass the Article III tests because the prospect of injury was not certain
enough. The CourtnotedthatArkansas' comparativereviewhadrecorded
capital punishment for others in Whitmore's class. Other persons
convicted of robbery-murder under similar fact scenarios to Whitmore's
have been sentenced to death in Arkansas, Whitmore's attempt to enter
under an interest in constitutional governance was also held to be too
generalized.
The Courtthen addressedWhitmore's attempttojoin as Simmons'
next friend. The Court outlined a two-part test for achieving next friend
status. First, the would-benext friendmust"provide adequate explanation
- such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability - why
the real party in interest cannot appear." Whitmore, 1727. Second, the
next friend must be "truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he seeks to litigate."Id., 1727. The Court added that there
is a heavy burden on the seeker to demonstrate the propriety of the next
friend status. Id., 1727.
Whitmore was unable to meet either requirement of the test. On
several occasions, Simmons stated his intention not to appeal and his
desire for execution. He also underwent psychiatric evaluation that
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pronounced him able to understand the nature of his choice. The fact that
Simmons was determined sane after thorough evaluation and that he
maintained his desire for execution made it impossible, in the Court's
view, for Whitmore to show the necessary incapacity. The Court decided
Whitmore was not truly dedicated to Simmons' cause because his
attempt tojoin as next friend was based primarily on his own self-interest
in delaying the execution of his sentence, and not out of a sincere concern
for Simmons as an individual.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A possible reason for the Court's strict holding in this case is to
avoid deciding whether the Constituition requires mandatory review of
capital cases. If Whitmore could have entered Simmons's case this
would have been the most obvious argument for him to make. The
Whitmore court specifically refused to rule on the matter, and the issue
is still open. Id. at 1723.
Virginia, unlike Arkansas, has a statutory provision requiring the
state supreme court to review all capital cases and sentences. Va. Code
Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990). Significantly, the statutory language is "re-
view", as opposed to "appeal". This has been interpreted to require
review in all cases. Briley v. Bass, 854 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Va. 1984),
construing Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
It is possible that a question involving the intervention of a next
friend could arise in a Virginia capital case context. Virginia common
law on next friend (also called prochein ami) is more liberal than the
standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court. Virginia does not
require the next friend to obtain the consent of the person he will
represent. SeeKirby v. Gilliam, 28 S.E.2d 40 (Va. 1943); Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-8 (1984) In Virginia, there are also no formal requirements
needed togain admissionto thecourtas nextfriend. See Jackson v. Counts,
54 S.E. 870 (Va. 1906). Presumably, it would be easier to bring a next
friend in for a Virginia capital defendant than it would be in Arkansas.
The code requires only thatthenext friend diligently press the cause once
he takes it, and makes no threshold demands on who can enter as next
friend on the litigant's behalf. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-8 (1990). For these
reasons it is unlikely that a case like Whitmore would arise in Virginia.
The dissent in Whitmore makes an interesting point in remarking
that under this holding there is no one who can enter under a general
concern for justice unless the defendant himself chooses to do so. The
interested party lacks standing by the Article III constraints. The only
alternative has been the traditional common law device of next friend.
Because the court intimates that only a near relative or acquaintance can
meet the strict requirements the majority imposes, a capital defendant
can force the state into executing an unlawful sentence, simply through
a waiver of appeal. In the opinion of the dissent, this clearly violates the
meaning of due process.
As a final point of analysis, the court mentioned in dicta that
despite Simmons's explicit desire to waive appeal and face execution,
his attorney still appeared before the court and outlined the avenues and
issues that were open to appeal. It might be argued that an attorney must
research and argue the merits of the case for the record, notwithstanding
the defendant's desire to be executed. Attorneys would also do well to
consider other resources to help persuade defendants to exercise their
rights guaranteed by law. A defendant in a recent capital case, Joseph
Savino, was initially willing to be executed. See, Savino v. Common-
wealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990), and case summary of
Savino v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. His at-
torney sought help from others, and ultimately Savino changed his mind
and went forward with his appeals process. Clients who volunteer for
execution may be an increasing problem for defense counsel. Of one
hundred forty people executed in the United States since reinstatement
of the death penalty in 1976, twenty-one have been volunteers. Nine of
those twenty-one, however, have been executed in the last sixteen
months. Death Row, U.S.A., N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. (Sept. 21, 1990). Arguing the case over defendant's wishes
will at least preserve a record for a reasonable, albeit belated defense, if
the defendanthas achange of heart. Counsel representing death sentenced
clients who wish to volunteer for execution may contact Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse for reference to persons skilled in counseling such
prisoners.
Summary and analysis by:
Peter T. Hansen
JUSTUS v. MURRAY
897 F.2d 709 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
A finding of error injury selection by the Virginia Supreme Court
overturned the first conviction and death sentence of Buddy Earl Justus.
Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87 (1980). On
remand, Justus was again found guilty of capital murder during the
commission of rape under Code § 18.2-31(e), now § 18.2-31(5), and
sentenced to death. This second conviction and sentence was upheld on
appeal. Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 283 S.E.2d 905 (1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983 (1982).
Failing in state habeas proceedings, Justus sought federal habeas
relief. His first petition was dismissed without prejudice because it
contained unexhausted claims. He then raised these claims back to the
Virginia Supreme Court but was denied on the grounds that the claims
were procedurally defaulted.
Justus returned to U.S. District Court and refiled for habeas relief.
This petition was also dismissed. He then brought this appeal to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The dismissal was
affirmed.
HOLDING
By reference to the findings of the federal magistrate at U.S.
District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on the
merits of two claims that related to the death sentence: ineffective
assistance of counsel at the penalty trial and denial of a court appointed
psychiatrist.
The remainder of Justus' claims were found defaulted under state
procedural requirements. Consequently the court refused to address
them.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Justus raised seven assignments of error to the Court of Appeals
fortheFourth Circuit. Theseclaims may beputinto three categories. The
first category, as noted, were two of appellant's claims turned down on
the merits throughout the state habeas process and likewise on federal
review by the U.S. District Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the disposition of these claims.
